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ABSTRACT 
The incidence of marriage and the proportion of childbearing
that occurs within marriage has decreased sharply in the 
United States in the last several decades. This paper examines 
whether the probability that a woman is currently married and 
the number of children she has born, as reported in the 1980 
U.S.Census, is related to two identifiable factors: the 
variation in welfare programs across states (specifically,
AFDC and Medicaid benefits and AFDC-UP expenditures) or in 
market wage opportunities available to women and to their 
potential husbands. AFDC and Medicaid benefit levels are 
associated with fewer women being currently married. Medicaid 
benefits are related to lower fertility levels for both black 
and white women, whereas AFDC benefits in cash and food are 
associated with lower fertility among white women age 15 -24. 
Those states that extend AFDC benefits to families with 
Unemployed Parents (i.e. fathers in intact poor families) do 
not have significantly more women married or higher fertility 
rates, as might be expected from economic incentives. Men's 
market wages are associated with more frequent marriage and· 
higher fertility, whereas higher market wage opportunities for 
women have substantial effects in the opposite direction, all 
of which are consistent with standard models of gender
specialization and the demand for marriage and fertility. 
KEY WORDS: Marriage, Fertility, Welfare System, United States 

I. INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, employment rates for mothers are at all time highs. 
Since 1973, fertility rates have hovered close to their historic lows, with about 
1.7 births per white woman and 2.4 births per black woman (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, 1982, 1991). Between 1965 and 1985 the number of families supported by 
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) progr~ increased by 270 
percent (Moffitt, 1992). Yet despite more mothers working, fewer children, and 
higher child welfare expenditures, poverty in the United States has increasingly 
become a problem among children. This appears to be a distinctive feature of the 
United States among high income countries (Smeeding and Torrey, 1988). Some 
worry that this child poverty problem is, in part, an unintended consequence of 
welfare increasing fertility, reducing marriage and reducing the incentive to 
work (Blank, 1985, 1989; Danziger et al., 1982; Ellwood and Bane, 1985; Ellwood 
and Crane, 1990; Levy, 1988; and Murray, 1984). 
Whatever the reasons, there have been substantial changes in family 
structure in the United States. The median age at marriage has been increasing, 
and a growing proportion of women are not marrying, particularly among blacks 
(Bennett et al., 1989). The fraction of births out of wedlock had increased to 
56 percent for blacks by 1979 and to 18 percent for whites (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, 1982, 1991). From 1970 to 1990, the fraction of white families with 
children that contain only a single parent doubled from 10 to 23 percent, while 
the fraction of single parent black families rose from 36 to 61 percent (U.S. 
Bureau of Census, 1991). 
In this study, an attempt is made to measure the impacts of welfare on 
marital status and fertility, controlling for the wage opportunities facing 
different types of women and their potential spouses. In studies that do not 
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control for wage opportunities, welfare variables may serve as proxies for poor 
labor market conditions or poor marriage prospects (from an economic 
perspective). 
The interrelationships are explored between different types of income 
support and aspects of family behavior that have important effects on the 
economic well-being of children: 
(1) The probability of work and the expected hour~y wage 
rates for a woman and her potential spouse (whether or 
not a woman actually has a spouse). 
(2) The likelihood of a woman living with a spouse, 
controlling for the expected hourly wage rates for the 
woman and for her potential spouse. 
(3) The expected number of children ever born, controlling 
implicitly for the probability of having wage work and 
explicitly for the expected hourly wage rates for the 
woman and for her potential spouse. 
The empirical analysis is primarily based on micro data from the 1980 U.S. 
Census. It involves several stages. 
For each race group (black, and nonblack hereafter referred to as "white"), 
a probit equation for the probability that a woman is a wage earner is jointly 
estimated together with an equation for the woman's expected log wage conditional 
on her being a wage earner. Also, a probit equation for the probability that the 
potential spouse is a wage earner is jointly estimated together with an equation 
for the spouse's expected log wage conditional on his being a wage earner. In 
the spouse equations, only the characteristics of the sampled women are used as 
explanatory variables to avoid including match-specific variables that are 
jointly determined aspects of the marital unions (Cf. Welch, 1974). One 
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advantage of the joint estimation of the equations for the probability of being 
a wage earner and the corresponding log wage equations is that the resulting 
estimated wage equations are corrected for selection into the samples of women 
and of spouses with observed wage rates (Heckman, 1987). The estimated wage 
equations are used to impute wage rates for all women including nonwage earners, 
and for all potential (i.e. predicted) spouses including the predicted spouses 
of currently unmarried women and currently married women. 
The predicted wage variables are included as explanatory variables in 
probit equations for the probability that a woman is currently married and 
enumerated with her spouse present (Section V), and in ordinary least squares 
equations for the number of children ever born (Section VI). Separate estimation 
results are presented for black and for white women in the age groups of 15-24, 
25-34 and 35-44. 
The contribution of this paper is to control for the effects of male and 
female wage opportunities, in order to assess without bias the effects of several 
forms of welfare support--AFDC cash and food, Medicaid, and unemployed parent 
(UP) benefits--on marriage and fertility. If one suspects that the matching of 
wife's and husband's characteristics, their marital status, and fertility are all 
intimately related social processes, it is not easy to identify one statistically 
from another. To avoid simultaneous equation bias, this paper relies only on the 
woman's characteristics to predict both her wage opportunities and those of her 
potential mate. For the same reason, fertility can be consistently estimated 
only for the combined sample of married and unmarried women, because correction 
for sample selection of the marital status specific samples are not identified 
and thus there is little justification, according to this view, for the practice 
in the literature of estimating fertility equations for the married, single, or 
female headed households, separately. 
Marriage.1/4 
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Empirical implementation is based on the 1980 Census public use sample 
merged with state information on welfare and unemployment programs and price 
level deflators. Not only has the 1980 Census been neglected for such analytical 
purposes, it provides unusual information on individual ownership of wealth 
income, which facilitates identification of the wage earner probit equations that 
are uJed to correct wage functions for sample selection bias. 
Cross sectional regressions of this form rely upon the assumption that 
individuals tend to reach their equilibrium fertility and marital status 
consistent with their economic endowments, state level employment opportunities, 
and welfare programs. Although panel data from NLSY or SIPP might be more useful 
for evaluating short run dynamics, long term behavioral tendencies may be 
portrayed adequately from the relatively stable cross sectional patterns. 
II. THE U.S. WELFARE PROGRAMS 
The most important components of the U.S. transfer system for the poor are 
the AFDC program, the food stamp program, and the Medicaid program. There are 
interrelationships among the programs that are of special relevance in 
considering possible effects of welfare on family structure and labor supply. 
1. The AFDC Program 
The AFDC program dates back to 1935. It is almost exclusively a cash 
transfer program for lone mothers. Benefits are determined by family-size-
specific "guarantee" levels and a progressive schedule for the reduction of the 
guarantee amounts with increases in family income. The reduction schedule is 
federally determined, but the income and asset eligibility requirements and the 




As Moffitt (1992) documents, the number of families receiving benefits 
under AFDC grew gradually from its inception to the mid 1960s, very rapidly over 
the 1965-1975 decade, and slowly since then. The growth in the AFDC caseload is 
determined by the population of those eligible for support and the participation 
rate for those eligible. The eligible population has changed with changes in the 
number of lone mothers and with state-specific changes in income and asset 
eligibility requirements. 
The participation rate is believed to be affected by the break even levels 
for the program for different types of families, with the break even level for 
a family being determined by its AFDC guarantee level and by the benefit 
reduction rate. The changes in the benefit reduction rate have been more 
dramatic than the state-specific changes in guarantee levels. The benefit 
reduction rate was 100 percent until 1967. Congress lowered it to 67 percent in 
1967, with this change being implemented over the 1967-1969 period. In 1981, 
Congress again increased the benefit reduction rate to 100 percent. 
There have been some changes in the participation rate for those eligible 
for support, perhaps due in part to changes in the guarantee levels and the 
benefit reduction rate. However, Moffitt (1992) concludes that the increase in 
the number of AFDC recipients since 1970 is overwhelmingly due to the increase 
in the number of lone mothers. The issue considered here is whether that 
increase in lone mothers was partly a response to AFDC benefit levels, or in 
other words, the unintended effect of the program was to increase the number of 
persons eligible for the program. 
2. The Food Stamp Program 
Begun in the mid-1960s, the food stamp program offers food coupons to 
families with low income and assets regardless of family type. The program 
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benefits and eligibility requirements are federally determined. The program 
remained small until 1973 when Congress mandated that all counties in all states 
must provide the program. By 1985 there were twice as many food stamp recipients 
as AFDC recipients, though the program expenditures were only 50 percent greater 
than for AFDC because the benefits are lower (Moffitt, 1992). 
There is a substantial overlap between the recipients of the food stamp and 
AFDC payments. As Moffitt (1992, Table 2) reports, in 198~, 30.5 percent of 
nonelderly single-parent families received food stamps and 86.2 percent of these 
also received AFDC benefits. In contrast, in 1984 only 3.6 percent of all 
nonelderly two-parent families received only food stamps. There are also 
important administrative links between the food stamp and the AFDC programs 
including eligibility requirements and joint taxation provisions. Single parent 
families tend to be disproportionately poor, and most are lone mothers, many of 
whom are eligible for food stamps. 
3. The Medicaid Program 
The Medicaid program, introduced in 1965, provides health benefits to low 
income families. The beneficiaries of this program have grown to exceed even 
that of the food stamp program. However, elderly, disabled and blind persons 
without dependent children constitute about 31 percent of those benefiting from 
Medicaid. Medicaid is federally subsidized and regulated. States have some 
leeway in defining eligibility, covered services, and the remuneration for 
covered services. 
There has been an expansion of coverage for children in poor two-parent 
families, but poor husband-wife couples are generally not eligible for Medicaid. 
For female-headed families, 37 states have extended eligibility for Medicaid to 
those not receiving AFDC benefits. However, coverage for non AFDC female-headed 
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families is generally only for major medical expenses, and then only after 
private assets have been used up. Thus, having full Medicaid coverage for a 
family largely depends on the absence of a husband and on having AFDC coverage. 
4. The AFDC-UP Program 
In approximately half the states in 1980, two-parent families meeting the 
income and asset conditions for AFDC and with children under ~8 are eligible for 
AFDC-UP (UP for unemployed parent) benefits. The primary earner in the family 
(usually the husband) must have a history of labor force attachment and earnings 
similar to what would be required for eligibility for unemployment insurance, and 
must be currently unemployed. In 1979, only 8 percent of AFDC benefits were paid 
to AFDC-UP families. Despite recent growth in this program, the proportion of 
AFDC beneficiaries enrolled under the AFDC-UP program was only 7 percent in 1985. 
Federal legislation now mandates the availability of AFDC-UP programs in all 
states, possibly because it is viewed as mitigating the anti-marriage bias 
implicit in the eligibility rules for the traditional AFDC program. 
III. CHARACTERIZING THE GENEROSITY OF WELFARE PROGRAMS 
In order to test for and estimate the influence of welfare programs on 
marital status and fertility behavior, variables must be specified to measure the 
generosity of the AFDC and foodstamp, Medicaid, and AFDC-UP programs. The AFDC 
and food stamp programs are treated here together because of the tax linkage 
between the programs (the food stamp program taxes AFDC benefits at a 30 percent 
rate). The combined real cash equivalent of the state-specific maximum 1979 
monthly AFDC benefits and the federally allotted food stamps for a mother with 
one child is the first program variable. Hereafter, this will be called the AFDC 
benefits. The correlations across states between the AFDC benefits for different 
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8 
sized families are very high, on the order of .95. Because of this, the state 
benefit level for one family size (here for a woman with one child) should 
adequately describe the entire state schedule for mothers with additional 
children. 
As measured by the AFDC benefits, there is substantial variation across 
states in the generosity of the AFDC and food stamp programs. The variable 
representing the generosity of the Medicaid program is each state's Medicaid 
vendor monthly reimbursements to children and adults in AFDC families, which is 
divided by the total number of AFDC families on the welfare rolls in that month, 
whether or not they received Medicaid benefits. As can be seen from Table 1, in 
1979 the average monthly Medicaid reimbursements to medical care providers per 
AFDC family were about half the average value for the AFDC benefits ($117 per 
month versus $252). 
From the perspective of this study, it is important to note that the 
Medicaid program provides family planning information and services that could 
help reduce unwanted births. 1 In many states, Medicaid also subsidizes prenatal 
care and delivery costs for AFDC mothers, but typically not those costs related 
to their first birth (Howell and Ellwood, 1991). These subsidies would lower the 
costs of having additional children. It is not known whether, on balance, the 
Medicaid program has pro- or anti-natal effect. Empirical evidence would be 
instructive. 
1Medicaid payments specifically for family planning services represent only 
.53 percent of total Medicaid vendor payments, but other billing categories may 
include subsidies for family planning, such as drugs (i.e. pill prescriptions), 
or clinic fees, or even hospital care (i.e. for sterilization operations). Also, 
only about one-half of the total Medicaid vendor payments are paid to 
categorically needy (AFDC) dependent children under 21 and adults in families 
with dependent children. Source: Medicaid Tabulations Tables 9 and 10 provided 
by Robert Moffitt. 
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Expenditures by state on the unemployed parent (AFDC-UP) welfare program 
are also expressed in monthly terms and divided by the total number of AFDC 
families in that month. These expenditures are only about $7 a month, but for 
the relatively few families enrolled under this program the average payment is 
larger than my AFDC cash and food stamp benefit level, because the AFDC-UP 
families tend to have more children. 
One might imagine that to explain the current marital and completed 
fertility of a woman who is, say, 40 years old, it is not the welfare system in 
the state of current residence that is relevant, but information about the 
welfare system in her state of residence 10 or 20 years earlier that may have 
influenced her relevant decisions. Two sources of error are thus introduced by 
the standard practice of using current policy measures instead of lagged ones: 
the state of current residence may have changed its welfare generosity relative 
to other states over this 10 to 20 years, and the woman may have migrated from 
another state in this period. 
Fortunately, the annual ranking of states by AFDC benefits has been 
relatively stable over time. This is illustrated by the simple correlation of 
AFDC benefits across states from one year to another year. For example, from 
1972 to 1979 and again from 1979 to 1986 the correlation of AFDC benefits across 
states is .9. 2 Medicaid programs have rapidly expanded, and lagged values of 
Medicaid are not readily defined across states before 1975, while Unemployed 
Parent AFDC programs are also a relatively recent phenomenon limiting comparisons 
across states in earlier years. Census data do not contain interstate migration 
2Alternatively, the Spearman rank correlation is also .90 between the AFDC 
benefit level across states in 1972 to 1979, and .94 between 1979 and 1986. The 
spread across states, summarized by the coefficient of variation, has also been 
quite stable at .39 in 1972, .38 in 1979, and .39 in 1986. The range between the 
minimum and maximum state narrowed slightly in relative terms from $60 to $216 
in 1979 to $88 to $280 in 1986. 
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histories to mitigate the second source of potential error. In conclusion, the 
errors due to not lagging welfare program variables is probably not serious in 
the case of the AFDC cash and food benefits, but may be more serious for older 
women in the case of Medicaid and AFDC-UP benefits. 
From Table 1 it can be seen that the state-specific measures for the 
gener0sity of the welfare programs are significantly correlated for the AFDC and 
Medicaid programs, and for the AFDC-UP and Medicaid programs, but are 
particularly strongly correlated for the AFDC and AFDC-UP programs. There is 
less relationship between the welfare benefit variables and the maximum number 
of weeks for which unemployment benefits can be collected in each state. 
Unemployment benefits are the main form of income support available to poor two-
parent families with a history of employment. The moderately high 
intercorrelations across states between these four indicators of generosity in 
the state welfare systems suggest that it may be difficult to estimate the 
separate effect of all program indicators simultaneously on marital status and 
fertility. 
IV. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The decisions determining current marital status and current fertility 
could be affected by a woman's anticipated economic opportunities, both within 
and outside of a marital union. Current predicted economic opportunities within 
and outside of marriage will be used as a proxy for the anticipated opportunities 
at the time when the decisions determining each woman's current marital status 
and fertility were actually made. For expositional simplicity, in the following 
discussion, welfare benefits are treated as potentially available only outside 
of marriage. Also, women will be regarded as being able to count on income from 








deviation) AFDC Medicaid AFDC-UP 
Unemployment 
duration 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1. AFDC maximum monthly 
benefit for mother and 252. 
one childb (78.9) 
2. Medicaid expenditures 117. .439 
per month per familyb (36.6) 
3. AFDC-UP expenditures 7.04 .649 .354 
per month per familyb (9.71) 
4. Maximum potential 
duration, in weeks, of 23.8 .256 .107 .398 
unemployment benefits (2.46) 
a Unweighted observations for 50 states and Washington, D.C. 
b The welfare variables are adjusted for cross sectional differences in the cost 
of living using the BLS price index for the intermediate income level "basket" 
of consumer goods in U.S. SMSAs and norunetropolitan areas. Thus the figures
used should approximate the real purchasing power of the welfare benefits. Of 
course, families are not free to use medicaid benefits for alternative 
purposes. See the text for other details of the AFDC, medicaid and AFDC-UP 
programs. 
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divorced women would receive child support and alimony payments and that 
currently married women would receive welfare benefits such as food stamps or 
AFDC-UP are disregarded in this conceptual section for simplicity, but are 
consistent with the empirical portion of this study. 
1. Earnings Opportunities 
Both the expected hourly wage rate a woman would receive if she worked 
(Wf) and the expected wage rate for her potential male partner (Wm) are modeled 
as functions of a vector of characteristics of the woman (Yf). Using only the 
woman's characteristics as explanatory variables for Wf and Wm avoids the 
possibility of including partner characteristics that are jointly determined 
together with the woman's marital status. Thus the wage equation for the woman 
can be represented as 
(1) Wf = Wf(Y6vf), 
and the wage equation for the woman's potential spouse is 
(2) Wm = Wm(Yf;vm), 
where vf and vm are error terms. 
The estimated wage equations are used to calculate predicted values for the 
wage offers that would be received by each woman if she worked (Wf), and by the 
potential spouse if he worked (Wm) . It is assumed that the predicted wage 
variables are not correlated with the error terms for the marriage and fertility 
equations. It would be expected that the original wage variables are determined, 




2. The Probability of Marriage 
The probability of a woman being currently married (Mf) is assumed to be 
a function of the predicted wage rate the woman could expect if she were employed 
(Wf); the predicted wage rate of her potential male partner (Wm); a vector of 
welfare benefits that would be available to her if she were not married (Bf); and 
a vector of other variables that affect the expected resources available to the 
woman regardless of whether she is married or unmarried (X~), such as her own 
personal wealth. The error term is denoted by u1 . 
Thus, the probability of marriage is represented as 
(3) Mf = Mf(Wf, Wm, xf, Bf; U1). 
Empirical evidence and some theories suggest that dMf/dWf < 0, dMf/dWm > 0, and 
dMtfdBf < 0 (Becker, 1974, 1981; Bishop, 1980; Nerlove and Schultz, 1970; 
Schultz, 1981; Wilson, 1987). The working assumptions for the maximum likelihood 
probit estimation are that the error is normally distributed and orthogonal to 
the observed covariates, and that it is independently and identically 
distributed. The marriage probability function (3) are estimated for men as well 
as for women, but only estimates for women are discussed in this paper. Those 
for all men are reported for comparison in Appendix Table A-2, based on estimated 
wage functions in Table A-1. 
3. Fertility Equations 
For both married and unmarried women, it is assumed that an increase in 
a woman's wage raises the shadow costs of children and increases her potential 
income constraint, with the hypothesized (but not theoretically necessary) 
consequence of reducing her demand for births. Virtually all economic studies 
of fertility find that either the female wage or female education is negatively 
correlated with fertility. Increases in the expected wage for a potential 
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husband are hypothesized to exert a less negative effect on a woman's fertility 
than increases in her own wage (Mincer, 1963, 1985). Indeed, under plausible 
assumptions increases in the expected male wage should have a positive effect on 
fertility, and there is considerable supporting empirical evidence for this 
pattern (Schultz, 1981, 1986). 
Therefore, for married women the fertility function is specified as 
(4) Po - Po (Wf, Wm, Xf; U2), 
where u2 is an error term. It is hypothesized that DF/dWf < 0 and DF/dWm > 0. 
For unmarried (single) women the fertility equation is 
F5 F5(5) = (Wf, Wm, xf, Bf; U3), 
where u3 is an error term and where the vector of welfare variables (Bf) is 
introduced. It is expected that dF5 /dWf < dPo/dWf < 0, dPo/dWm > dF5 /dWm > 0, and 
dF5 /dBf > 0 (Becker, 1981; Leibowitz et al., 1986; Lundberg and Plotnick, 1990; 
Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1985; T.P. Schultz, 1981, 1986, 1990; T.W. Schultz, 1974; 
Whittington and Peters, 1990). 
Since marital status can be changed, an equation is needed for a woman's 
expected fertility, (Ft), without conditioning on her marital status. 
Unconditional fertility is the sum of the marital status specific fertility 
variables weighted by the respective probabilities of being currently married or 
unmarried; that is, 
(6) Ft = MfFD + (1 - Mf)F5 • 
If equation (4) and (5) were estimated to assess directly the factors 
affecting fertility of married and unmarried women separately, sample selection 
bias could be expected, because the error, U1 , in the marriage selection equation 
(3) is likely to be related to errors, U2 and U3 , in the marital status specific 
fertility equations because they would capture the effects of common omitted 
variables. Since I see no conceptual basis for identifying the required sample 
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selection correction procedure (Heckman, 1987), I estimate fertility determinants 
without bias based on equation ( 6) for the combined married and unmarried sample. 
Fortunately, some of the signs of the derivatives of the unconditional fertility 
function (6) are implied by the conditions already hypothesized for equations 
(3), (4) and (5). 
Ignoring nonwage effects for expository convenience, it can be seen that 
the effects on unconditional fertility are expected to bE: negative for the 
woman's predicted wage and positive for the predicted wage of her potential 
spouse, provided that the married fertility level is higher than the unmarried 
F5fertility level (FD - > 0). That is, 
and 
Welfare benefits may reduce the probability of a woman being married, 
since these benefits represent an alternative source of support, and also because 
poor families cannot normally qualify for AFDC benefits with an able bodied 
husband present. For these reasons, the welfare benefits may indirectly tend to 
reduce fertility, provided that the married fertility level exceeds the unmarried 
fertility level. At the same time, however, by relaxing the budget constraint 
for unmarried mothers, welfare benefits would tend to encourage child bearing 
among unmarried women. Thus a priori information is insufficient to determine 
the expected sign for the effect of welfare benefits on the unconditional 
fertility level. That is, 
> 
(9) dMf/ dBf ( FD - F6 ) + dF5 / dBf < 0 . 
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V. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
In order to obtain racial samples of roughly equal size, observations for 
one in every 20 white women age 15-65 and for every other black woman age 15-65 
were drawn from the one-in-a-thousand sample A of the 1980 U.S. Census of 
Population. In Table 2, the means and standard deviations for the variables are 
reporced for black and white women age 15-24, 25-34, 35-44 and 15-65. 
VI. INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN WELFARE AND EARNINGS 
Predicted wage variables are needed as explanatory variables in equations 
for the probability that a woman is married and living with a spouse (Section 
VII) and for the number of children ever born (Section VIII). Wage participation 
equations are needed in order to obtain predicted wage variables that are 
corrected for the selection of women and their potential spouses into the samples 
of wage earners. The wage participation equations are also of interest in their 
own right. 
1. Previous Research 
There have been a number of cross-sectional studies specifically seeking 
to estimate the effects of the AFDC benefit parameters--the state determined 
guarantee levels and the federally determined benefit reduction rate- -on measures 
of the labor supply of female heads. Moffitt (1992, p. 17) notes that this 
previous research "unequivocally shows that the AFDC program generates nontrivial 
work disincentives .... ", but he is of the opinion, that the estimated responses 
are too small to substantially alter the poverty picture or the optimal size of 




MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS 8 OF THE VARIABLES 
FOR BLACK AND WHITE WOMEN, AGE 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 15-65a 
Black White 
Variables 15-24 25-34 35-44 15-65 15-24 24-34 35-44 15-65 
Dependent Variables: 
Currently married .115 .438 .485 .347 .255 .669 .801 .606 
and spouse present (.319) (.496) (.500) (.476) (.436) (.459) (.400) (.489) 
(=1) 
Children ever born .563 1.87 3.21 2.11 .126 1. 38 2.58 1. 73 
(.941) (1.57) (2 .44) (2. 45) (. 602) ' (1. 31) (1. 68) (1.83) 
Explanatory Variables: 
Woman's predicted .986 1.40 1.48 1.24 1.16 1.45 1.52 1.40 
log hourly wage (.233) (.204) (.227) (.332) (.176) (.200) (.202) (.252) 
Potential spouse's 
predicted log 1.21 1.63 1.79 1.51 1.53 1.90 2.09 1.87 
hourly wage (.187) (.139) (.144) (.297) (.182) (.152) (.165) (.296) 
Age (years) 19.3 29.2 39.1 34.5 19.5 29.3 39.2 36.6 
(2.84) (2.84) (2.90) (14.4) (2.83) (2.88) (2.87) (14.7) 
Woman's property income .0047 .0023 .0046 .0325 .0531 .0989 .166 .258 
($1000/year) (.0948) (.247) (.794) (.615) (.513) (.946) (1.48) (1.98) 
Urban resident .837 .878 .858 .850 .796 .811 .796 .801 
(=1) (.369) (.327) (.349) (.358) (.403) (.391) (.403) (.399) 
Hispanic . 0141 . 0111 . 0141 . 0133 . 0728 . 0771 . 0633 . 0643 
(=l) (.118) (.105) (.118) (.115) (.260) (.266) (.244) (.245) 
AFDC benefits indicator 226. 231 232 230. 252. 255. 251. 253.1 
($per month) (68.2) (69.4) (69.0) (68.9) (73.6) (73.8) (73.0) (73.1) 
Medicaid Expenditures 123. 126. 129. 126. 127. 130. 129. 129. 
($per month) (43.0) (42.0) (45.1) (43.3) (39.0) (40.3) (39.1) (40.0) 
Unemployed Parent (UP) 
AFDC expenditures 6.70 7.42 7.32 7.13 9.97 10.4 10.2 10.1 
($ per month) (9.15) (9.44) (9.19) (9.29) (10.2) (10.5) (10.5) (10.2) 
Schooling 11.1 12.3 11.4 11.1 11.4 13.0 12.3 11.9 
(years completed) (2.15) (2.44) (2.72) (2.93) (2.28) (2.76) (2.69) (2.82) 
Percent of Women with 
No Children 65.3 20.8 12.2 32.8 81. 3 33.7 11.5 35.9 
Sample size 2891 2255 1485 9075 2609 2362 1643 9752 
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. The predicted wage variables are obtained 
from equations reported in Tables A-1 and A-2 and discussed later in the text. 
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2. AFDC Effects on the Probability of Being a Wage Earner 
In this study, as in most others based on cross-sectional data, the only 
variation in the welfare program variables is inter state. Coefficient estimates 
for probit equations for the probability of being a wage earner and for log wage 
equations are estimated jointly by maximum likelihood methods, and they are 
presented in Appendix Table A-1. 3 The wage equations allow for different slope 
coefficients for primary (0-8 years), secondary (9-12) and higher (13 or more) 
years of schooling. A variable for years of potential work experience (i.e., age 
- schooling - 7) and the square of this experience variable are also included, 
as well as dummy variables for whether a woman resides in an urban area and for 
whether she is hispanic. The urban residence variable may capture the higher 
cost of urban living, with possible compensating higher wages. Hispanics are 
distinguished because of possible differences in language skills, immigrant 
status, and educational quality. 
The probit equations for the probability of being employed include all of 
the variables in the wage equations plus three identifying variables: (1) the 
state-specific maximum period for receipt of unemployment benefits (a common 
measure of program generosity), (2) the state AFDC cash and food benefit level, 
and (3) the individual property income (i.e. dividends, interest, rents and 
royalties) from the census. These latter variables are all expected to increase 
the workers shadow value of not working and yet have no immediate effect on wage 
opportunities, thus providing a basis to identify the selection correction model. 
3 Self employed and family unpaid workers are included in the estimation 
sample, as well as the unemployed but searching for a job. Thus, the probit 
model estimates the probability of being in a wage or salary job, or not, and not 
whether the individual is in the labor force or not. This choice could be 




The three variables specified to identify the selection-correction model-­
property income, unemployment benefits, and AFDC benefits--are jointly 
statistically significant according to the likelihood ratio test, for each of the 
four race-spouse samples, and generally contribute as anticipated to a reduction 
in the probability that a woman or her potential spouse works for wages. The 
coefficient for the variable representing the state-specific maximum number of 
weeks unemployment benefits can be collected is negative,and statistically 
significant for black and white women and for the husbands of black women. The 
AFDC benefit indicator coefficient is also negative, and statistically 
significant for black women and their potential husbands as well as for the 
potential husbands of white women. The effect of property income owned by the 
woman is estimated nonlinearly (as a quadratic) and is jointly significant for 
white and black women and white women's potential husband. 
The magnitude of the wage labor supply disincentive association with AFDC 
benefits is modest. As seen from the sample statistics in Table 2, the average 
level of the AFDC benefits is $230 for all black women with a standard deviation 
of 69, and $250 for white women with a standard deviation of 73. Evaluated at 
the observed proportion of women who are wage earners (.57 for black women; .61 
for white women), a one standard deviation increase in the AFDC benefits is 
associated with a decrease in the probability of being a wage earner of .03 for 
a black woman and .01 for a white woman. Thus, the findings of this study lend 
support to the conclusion that the effects of welfare programs on work effort are 
clear but modest in magnitude. 
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VII. WELFARE EFFECTS ON MARITAL STATUS 
There has been concern that the AFDC program might contribute to the 
decline of the two-parent family. Moffitt sums up the reasons for this: 
Because benefits are paid primarily to female heads of family with 
children but with no spouse present ... , the program provides an 
obvious incentive to delay marriage, increase rates of marital 
dissolution, delay remarriage, and have children outside of a 
marital union, all of which will lower the percentage of the 
population that is married. Virtually any model of marital status 
and childbearing behavior will have these implications. 
(Moffitt, 1992, p. 27) , 
1. Previous Research 
Previous studies using census data to examine the effects of AFDC and other 
welfare programs on marital status found few statistically significant patterns. 
Ellwood and Bane (1985) find fairly strong affects of AFDC on living arrangements 
(single mother) and increased divorce, based on a variety of estimation methods 
and data sources, including the 1960 and 1970 censuses. More recent studies 
based on the smaller Panel Survey of Income Dynamics have focused on the 
association between welfare benefits and transitions over time among marital 
states. Hoffman, Duncan and Laren (1991) find that the state level of AFDC 
benefits does not affect the probability of divorce, but does influence the 
probability of a divorced woman receiving welfare. Hoffman and Duncan (1988) 
find that higher AFDC benefits reduce the transitions to remarriage. Hoffman, 
Duncan and Mincy (1991) find that women are more likely to be currently married, 
or unmarried but not on welfare, in states where AFDC benefits are less generous. 
Danziger et al (1982) consider the effects of the economic well being of women 
on their headship rates, and thereby infer a relatively small effect of AFDC 
benefits on female headship proportions. 
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Moffitt (1990) examines welfare effects on marriage using cross sectional 
data from the large 1967, 1977, and 1985 Current Population Surveys. He finds 
effects of AFDC on marriage and on female headship, which have increased over 
time for blacks and whites, and are statistically significant for 1985 even when 
regional controls are included in the regression. Based on both this micro data 
evidence and time series analyses, Moffitt concludes: 
Although the studies of the 1980s show slightly strQnger effects 
than the earlier studies, the effects are still generally small in 
magnitude. In particular, insofar as it is possible to determine, 
none of the studies finds effects sufficiently large to explain, for 
example, the increase in female headship in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. 
(Moffitt, 1992, p. 31) 
However, previous studies have not controlled for many aspects of a woman's 
economic circumstances--wage opportunities and wealth--that could affect her 
decision about whether to live with a spouse. Also little attention has been 
paid to welfare programs other than AFDC. 
2. Estimated Welfare Effects on the Probability of a Woman Living with a Spouse 
Predicted log hourly wage rates for both the woman and for her potential 
husband are included in the probit equations for the probability of a woman being 
currently married with spouse present. Also the woman's property income variable 
is included (Cf. Schultz, 1990). The economic gains from marriage are expected 
to be lower for women who can command higher wage rates, lower for women who have 
more property income, and higher for women whose potential spouses have higher 
wage rates. The predicted wage variable is identified by the exclusion of her 
education and the state level unemployment program variable from the marriage 
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equation. An age variable, and dummy variables for residing in an urban area and 
for being hispanic, are also included, to correspond with the wage equations. 4 
Finally, three welfare variables are included in the equations for the 
probability of being currently married. The first is the AFDC monthly benefits. 
The second is the average benefits per family under the AFDC-UP program. And the 
third is the average Medicaid expenditures per AFDC family. 5 AFDC-UP program 
was designed to counteract AFDC incentives for fathers to le~ve their families. 
Hence the reason for including this variable is obvious. Medicaid benefits could 
affect the probability of a woman living with a spouse, because she is eligible 
for these benefits if she has dependent children and in most circumstances no 
spouse. The ready availability of these benefits to single mothers and their 
families when on AFDC could reduce the gains to marriage. 
Separate estimation results are presented in Table 3 for black and for 
white women in the age groups of 15-24, 25-34, 35-44 and 15-65, where the welfare 
and labor market conditions in 1979 are more likely to be relevant in determining 
the woman's expected opportunities across marital states for the younger samples, 
but the estimates do not change much when the welfare variables are lagged ten 
years for women aged 25-34 and 35-44. The results for the coefficients of the 
wage rate and property income variables are mixed, but largely in accord with a 
4The quadratic terms in wages, property income and age are also omitted 
because narrower age brackets are the basis for estimation and most higher order 
terms became insignificant. 
5Interactions between the woman's education and both medicaid and AFDC were 
jointly statistically significant at the . 05 level in several of the age and race 
specific samples. The reason for including the AFDC-low schooling interaction 
variable is that women with low schooling levels would be expected to be more 




PROBIT ESTIMATES OF PROBABILITY OF LIVING WITH A SPOUSE, 
FOR WOMEN, BY RACE AND AGEa 
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( 1. 92) 
13.2 
( 1. 71) 
-4.03 
(30.6) 
Chi squared statistic 
(10 df.) 
384.8 67.3 22.6 1428. 735.8 90.6 40.3 2482. 
a 
b 
Absolute value of asymptotic t ratio is reported in parentheses beneath probit coefficient. 
Predicted log wage variable on the basis of the appropriate selection corrected wage equation in Table 3. 
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priori expectations, particularly f0r whites. 6 Using a 10 percent critical 
region, the coefficient of the AFDC benefits indicator is significantly negative 
for black and for white women 15-24 years of age, but only at the 15 percent 
level at ages 25-34. The coefficient estimates for the AFDC-UP variable are 
never significantly different from zero. The coefficient estimates for the 
Medicaid variable, however, are generally significantly negative for both black 
and white women. The magnitudes of the significant coefficients on AFDC and 
Medicaid benefits are similar for black and whites, although the levels of 
marriage are much lower for blacks. Most studies of the marital status effects 
of welfare programs have overlooked the Medicaid program. 7 It would be ironic 
if substantial numbers of husbands and fathers in low income families in the 
United States have opted to move out so that the mother and children could have 
access to basic health care that is provided on a universal basis in most other 
high income countries, such as Canada (Smeeding and Torrey, 1988). In terms of 
opportunities in the labor market, the theoretical expectation that the 
prevalence of marriage declines as women's wages increase relative to men's is 
6No account is taken in the computation of the standard errors of the fact 
that the wage rates are predicted for women and their potential spouse based on 
auxiliary equations. It is likely, therefore, that all coefficient standard 
errors are biased and probably too small. Hypothesis tests based on the reported 
t ratios are thus likely to be weaker than reported. 
7If the Medicaid expenditure variable is excluded from the marriage probit 
equation, the AFDC benefit variable has a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient at the 5 percent confidence level for black and white women aged 15-
24 and 25-34, confirming the tendency others have noted (Moffitt, 1990) for 
marriage and female headship rates to be decreased and increased, respectively, 
by welfare benefit levels across states. Including Medicaid expenditures per 
AFDC family as an explanatory variable in the marriage probit equation always 
reduces the magnitude and statistical significance of the probit coefficient on 
the AFDC benefit indicator variable as expected given the .44 correlation between 
AFDC and Medicaid benefits shown in Table 1. These findings suggest that state 
health insurance programs (Medicaid) provided to poor families may be a greater 




strongly confirmed for whites at all ages, and there is some support for the view 
that property income of the woman weakens the demand for marriage on her part, 
as observed in some other societies (Schultz, 1990). But increases in women's 
wages reduces the probability of marriage only among the youngest cohort of black 
women, age 14-25, and it appears to increase the likelihood of marriage among 
older black women. 8 
VIII. FERTILITY EFFECTS 
To aid financially poor children is to lessen the expected financial burden 
of children for parents who would consider welfare an acceptable--perhaps even 
a planned--means of support for their children. Both the public and policy 
makers have feared that welfare programs might encourage out-of-wedlock 
childbearing and childbearing by women who realize their marriages may be 
unstable and who have limited financial means. 
8Since information is also available on men's current marital status and 
whether they are residing with their wife, identically specified sample selection 
corrected wage equations (Table A-2) and probit marriage equations ( Table A-3) 
are calculated for all men by age groups, relying in this case only on the male's 
characteristics. AFDC benefits continue to exert a disincentive effect on black 
men and the potential wives of black and white men to work as wage earners (Table 
A-2). Increases in men's wage opportunities are associated with an increased 
probability of men being currently married, and this pattern is statistically 
significant in all age and race groups except for blacks age 35-44 (Table A-3). 
The wage opportunities of their potential wives account significantly for a 
decreased probability of marriage for white men at all ages and for black men age 
15-24. AFDC cash and food benefits are related to increased marriage among white 
males age 35-44, but not significantly in the other race or age samples. Medicaid 
expenditures are a statistically significant deterrent to marriage only among the 
youngest white men, whereas AFDC-UP expenditures are unexpectedly associated with 
a lower probability of marriage among white males age 15-24 and 35-44. In sum, 
the male side of the marriage market suggests the same strong role of sex­
specific labor market opportunities on marriage, but less consistent signs than 




1. Previous Research 
Despite the concern, there has been relatively little research on the 
fertility effects of welfare programs. Leibowitz et al. (1986) report evidence 
that AFDC benefits increase the likelihood that a pregnant teenager will decide 
to keep her child, rather than resort to abortion. Ellwood and Bane (1985) find 
some increase in the fraction of never married women age 24-34 with children in 
higher AFDC benefit states. Duncan and Hoffman (1990) fi~d a weak positive 
effect of AFDC benefit levels on the probability of out-of-wedlock births to 
mothers who subsequently receive AFDC payments, but no effect for mothers who do 
not subsequently receive AFDC payments. Using data for 1979-84 from the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, Plotnick (1990) finds that the AFDC program raises 
the hazard rate for out-of-wedlock births for white teenagers. He finds no 
significant response pattern for blacks or hispanics. However, the smaller 
sample sizes for blacks and for hispanics may explain this latter result. None 
of the studies I know of has analyzed fertility of married and unmarried women 
together, which it was argued earlier is more likely to yield unbiased estimates. 
Many recent studies have also restricted their samples to teenage women who are 
responsible for only a small and presumably unrepresentative fraction of all 
births that might be affected by welfare benefits and labor market 
conditions. 
2. Estimates of Welfare Effects on the Number of Children Ever Born 
To examine whether higher welfare benefits are associated with higher 
fertility levels, the number of children ever born was regressed on the same 
variables included in the equations for the probability of a woman being 
currently married. Because the fertility variable is bounded at zero, Tobit as 
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well as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates were compared, and even in the 
youngest age group of women, among whom two-third of the blacks were childless 
and three-fourths of the whites, the statistical significance of the Tobit and 
OLS coefficients are parallel and the slopes of the expected value locus are 
similar. 9 Consequently, the easier to interpret linear OLS estimates are 
reported in Table 4 and discussed here, and the Tobi ts are presented for 
reference in Table A-4. As in the marriage equation, the wage variables are 
identified by the exclusion from the fertility equation of the woman's education 
and the state level unemployment program variable. 
An increase in women's wage rates of 25 percent is associated, according 
to these estimates, with a decrease in number of children ever born by black 
women of.80 at age 15-24, .69 at age 25-34, and .69 at age 35-44. For white 
women the effect of the same percentage increase in female wages is to decrease 
fertility in these three age groups by .40, .49 and .36, respectively, all of 
which effects are significant statistically. The impact on fertility of wage 
opportunities of the potential husband is positive, as suggested by economic 
theory, and also larger among younger aged women, and becomes statistically 
insignificant at age 35-44. If these cross sectional age-specific estimates are 
assumed to trace out synthetically the effects of permanent changes in wages 
opportunities on a cohort's reproductive experience, then improved potential 
husband wage opportunities are associated with earlier childbearing, but not 
necessarily more children over the woman's entire lifetime, i.e. by age 35-44 the 
effects are insignificant and small. Conversely, increased female wage 
opportunities deters early childbearing (age 15-24), but this effect of early 
90rdered probit models were also estimated up to four or more children. 
Threshold values were reasonable and slope coefficients were similar to those 
implied by the OLS or Tobit models. 
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TABLE 4 
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSIONS FOR CHILDREN EVER BORN 
TO WOMEN, BY RACE AND AGE OF THE MOTHERa 
Black Wnite 
Explanatory variables 15-24 25-34 35-44 15-65 15-24 24-34 35-44 15-65 
Woman's predicted logb -3.62 -3.10 -3.10 -3.41 -1.81 -2.22 -1.63 -1.65 
hourly wage (17.8) (8.71) (4.06) ( 13.3) (16.6) (15.9) (6.08) (15.8) 
Potential partner's 2.28 1.59 .522 2.44 .381 .603 .152 .0656 
predicted log hourly wageb (7 .18) (2.37) (.42) (6.03) (2.59) (2.43) (.40) (.53) 
Woman's property income_ .174 .156 .0260 - .103 -.0124 -.0338 -.0806 -.02153per year (x10 ) (1.10) (1.26) (.34) (2.96) ( .62) ( 1.32) (2.98) (2.88) 
Age (years) .586 .175 1.55 .405 -.0999 .120 .211 .328 
(6.54) ( .70) (2.43) (19.3) (1.66) ( .61) ( .49) (33.1) 
Age Squared (x10-2) -.851 -.0449 -1 .80 -.433 .620 .0509 - .139 -.319 
(3.87) (.11) (2.22) (17.4) (4.16) (.15) (.25) (27.4) 
Urban resident (=1) .0908 -.243 .133 -.243 - .0173 - .0991 -.256 -.126 
(1.66) (2.23) (. 70) (3.53) (.55) ( 1.45) (2.36) (3.20) 
Hispanic <=1) - .102 -.607 - .719 - .0471 .150 .592 .450 .531 N 
(.79) (2.04) (1.40) ( .25) (3.44) (5.83) (2.46) (8.23) 00 
AFDC benefits indicator .0021 .130 - .0544 .0572 -.0675 .0382 .0557 - .01542($ per month x10 ) (.01) (1. 71) ( .34) (1.05) (2.94) (. 70) ( .62) (.47) 
Medicaid expenditures - .106 -.368 -.376 -.343 -.0235 - .147 -.0630 -.0857 
($ per family per month x10-2) (2.25) (3.90) (2.05) (5.24) (.76) (2.06) (.53) (1.97) 
AFDC-UP expenditures .258 -.735 -1.49 -.521 .0833 -.273 -.633 - .0553 
($per family per month x10-2) ( .99) (1.43) (1.43) ( 1.44) (.54) (.78) (1.08) (.26) 
Intercept -6.66 -.682 -25.6 -4.74 1.51 -.322 -1.16 -2.86 
(7.90) C.19) (2.05) (25.2) (2.77) (.11) (.14) (21.8) 
R2 .268 .146 .113 .311 .247 .206 .081 .376 
: Absolute value of asymptotic t ratio is reported in parentheses beneath slope coefficient. 
Predicted log wage variable on the basis of the appropriate selection corrected wage equation in Tables A-1 and A-2. 
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delay is neither augmented, nor does a compensating catching up in fertility 
appear to occur after age 34. It is interesting to note that if this 25 percent 
increase in wages benefits accrues to both women and their potential spouses, 
their fertility is expected to decrease by about one-third of a child for both 
black or white women. But if the wage opportunities of women improve relative 
to men, the depressing effects on fertility, and for that matter on marriage, are 
potentially more substantial. 
The expectation that property income of the woman would be associated with 
her being better able to afford more children is not confirmed by the estimates. 
The only statistically significant coefficient on her property income variable 
in the age specific fertility regressions is for white women age 35-44, and in 
this case the coefficient is negative, contrary to expectation. Women in urban 
places of residence tend to have fewer children, while Hispanic women tend to 
have more children, other things being equal. 
For white women in the 15 - 24 age group, the coefficient for the AFDC 
benefits is negative, whereas it is positive for black women age 25-34. There 
is no evidence that states which have more generous AFDC-UP programs have 
distinctly different fertility. However, the coefficient estimates for the 
Medicaid variable are always negative and uniformly statistically significant for 
black women and significant for white women age 25-34. These estimated effects 
of Medicaid on the fertility are at least twice as large for black women as for 
white women, within each age group. 
According to Tables 3 and 4, those age and race groups in which the 
negative association between Medicaid expenditures and fertility is more 
significant are also groups in which the relationship between Medicaid and 
reduced marriage is observed. The Medicaid-fertility pattern could arise because 
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Medicaid provides either or both s1tbsidized family planning information and 
supplies that reduce the cost of avoiding an unwanted birth, and a subsidy to 
health care of children and mothers that is generally unavailable to married 
mothers. The Medicaid coefficient estimates imply that a fifty percent increase 
in the state level of Medicaid reimbursements (amounting to an average of about 
$65 per month per AFDC family) is associated with a reduction in fertility rates 
of black women age 15-24, 25-34 and 35-44 by .059, .239, and ,244, respectively, 
and will reduce the fertility rates for white women age 15-24, 25-34, and 35-44 
by .015, .096, and .041, respectively. 
The intriguing question is precisely why the state welfare variables are 
associated with family behavior. Regardless, these results do suggest that there 
are significant associations between fertility, marriage, and labor supply and 
state welfare variables, underlining the importance of further research on this 
topic. 
IX. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper examines the effects of AFDC and food stamps, AFDC-UP and 
Medicaid on women's marital choices and fertility, controlling for the wage and 
unearned income opportunities facing different types of women and the men they 
are likely to marry. In studies in which these earnings effects are not 
controlled for, these labor market opportunities may be spuriously attributed to 
welfare variables, or biased by the analysis of marital status groups that are 
not representative of the population potentially affected by the welfare system. 
In general, the estimated effects of the AFDC and Medicaid benefits 
variables on the probability of being currently married and on the number of 
children ever born are found to be often statistically significant and negative. 
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More generous Medicaid benefits are associated with lower probabilities for a 
woman being currently married and living with her husband. This also seems to 
be the case for AFDC benefits, at least for younger women, though the results are 
weaker than for Medicaid. Moreover, for fertility, the estimated Medicaid 
effects are consistently negative, while the AFDC effects are negative and 
statistically significant only for white women aged 15-24. The estimated effects 
of the AFDC-UP program are not significantly different from zero in either the 
marital status or the fertility equations. These findings demonstrate the 
importance of allowing for the possibility that different types of welfare 
programs, i.e. health care in contrast. to cash and food benefits, may have 
qualitatively different effects on marital and reproductive behavior. Different 
age and educational groups are also found to be affected differently, but this 
may reflect the measurement of the policy variables in 1979 that may better 
approximate the relevant policy constraints on marriage and fertility decisions 
for the younger women in my 1980 census sample. 
Although AFDC and Medicaid are found to have statistically significant 
effects on marital and fertility behavior, the estimated effects are modest in 
size. The results lend support to the conclusion that unintended effects of 
welfare programs on family decision making are not responsible for a large share 
of the observed increase in recent years in the number of lone mothers with 
dependent children. The relative improvement in wage opportunities of women 
compared to men is clearly the dominant factor that could explain changes in the 
prevalence of marriage and the level of fertility in the United States. Previous 
studies of marriage and fertility have not attempted, as in this paper, to 
control for the wage opportunities facing women and men. Among black women over 
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age 25, who have increasingly remained unmarried (Bennett, 1989), evidence was 
found that with increases in women's wages, the probability of being currently 
married increases, although fertility may be expected to continue to decline 
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PROBIT COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR THE PROBABILITY OF WOMEN BEING A WAGE EARNER 
AND SELECTION CORRECTED REGRESSION COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR LOG WAGE EQUATIONSa 
For the expected For the expected 
spouse of a spouse of 
For a black woman For a white woman black woman a white wom~n 
Prob. of Prob. of Prob. of Prob. of 
being a Log of being a Log of being a Log of being a Log of 
Explanatory variables wage hourly wage hourly wage hourly wage hourly 
earner wage earner wage earner wage earner wage 
Years of schooling
Primary -.030 -.024 -.036 .001 -.019 -.060 .007 .049
(1.89) ( 1.35) (2.17) (.09) C .98) (3.27) ( .40) (3.19) 
Secondary .244 .112 .204 .056 .101 .081 .087 .082
(21.2) (4.46) (18.0) C1.66) (7.66) (3.94) (6.93) (7.18) 
Higher .160 .106 .049 .105 .065 .062 .019 .029
(13.8) (7.47) (5.44) (13.9) (6.14) (4.42) (2.34) (4.95) 
Potential experience .054 .040 .004 .023 .098 .048 .125 .044
C17.6) (7 .17) (1.20) (10.7) (25.2) (2.95) (36.9) (4.58) 
Potential experience_ 1 -.108 -.078 -.040 -.035 -.202 -.093 -.276 -.• 078squared (x 100 ) (15.5) (6.58) (5.44) (4.25) (23.7) (2.71) (36.1) (3.48) 
Urban resident(= 1) .010 .199 .076 .122 -.098 .244 .001 .203
( .24) (5.91) (2.24) (5.45) (2.28) (4.99) (.04) (7.42) L,..) 
Hispanic<= 1) -.231 -.068 -.035 .017 -.021 - .106 -.092 -.089 °' (1.97) ( .45) ( .65) C.53) C.17) C .82) (1.63) (2.00) 
W'?fMn's pror,rt~. 1 .071 .012 -.047 -.125income ex ,00 ) (1.83) C. 72) (.51) (10.4) 
Woman's property income. 1 -.0020 -.0012 -.001 .0017squared (x 1,000,000 ) (1.55) (1.83) (.07) (1.52) 
Duration of unemployment -.0190 -.0133 -.0248 -.0026
benefits (2.78) (2.20) (3.40) (.42) 
AFDC benefits indicator_, -.0851 -.0164 -.0659 -.0646 
(x 100 ) (3.98) C.90) (2.92) (3.52) 
Intercept -.023 .607 .322 .814 -.624 1.17 -.869 .697
(.12) (2.63) (1. 70) (3.40) (2.96) (2.96) (4.51) (3.27) 
Sigma/rho .829 .131 .637 .065 .813 .182 .708 .100
(66.9) C. 71) (83.9) (.16) (27.9) C. 72) (91.4) C .61) 
-Log likelihood 11804 11746 m1 10878 
Mean of dependent .57 1.40 .61 1.46 .27 1.80 .49 2.03
variable ( .49) ( .87) (.49) ( .68) (.44) C .83) (.50) C .74) 
Sample size 9075 5213 9752 5909 9075 2474 9752 4753 
a The absolute value of the asymptotic t ratio is repqrted in parentheses below each coefficient. the numbers rer:rted 1n the row labeled 11sigma7rho11 include first the standard error of theprobit equations followed by the correlation of the errors from the probi wage earner and loij·linear wage rateequations that are here estimated by joint maximum likelihood methods. Beneath both sigma and rho in parentheses is the ratio of this estimate to itsstandard error. 
--
TABLE A-2 
PROBIT COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR THE PROBABILITY OF MEN BEING A WAGE EARNER 
AND SELECTION CORRECTED REGRESSION COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR LOG WAGE EQUATIONSa 
tor tne expectea tor tne expectea 
srause of a spouse of 
For a black man For a white man back man a white man 
Prob. of Prob. of Prob. of Prob. of
being a Log of being a Log of being a Log of being a Log of
Explanatory variables wage hourly wage hourly wage hourly wage hourly 
earner wage earner wage earner wage earner wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Years of schooling
Primary -.0494 .0133 -.0161 .0330 -.0057 .0036 .0612 .0375 
(3.80) C1. 02) (1.03) (3.02) (.36) ( .18) (3.27) C1. 71) 
Secondary .2340 .0793 .2220 .0762 .1070 .0693 .0554 .0188
(19.1) (2.64) (18.0) (5.22) (7. 11) (3. 11) (4.30) (1.54) 
Higher .1020 .0716 .0092 .0695 .1160 .0830 .0367 .0567 
(7.15) (6.21) (1.11) C16.8) (10.3) (4.17) (5.40) (9.05) 
Potential experience .0705 .0443 .0467 .0540 .1130 .0482 .0934 .0165 
(20.6) (5.17) (13.1) C16.3) (24.5) (3.10) (25.8) (1.57) 
Potential experience_ 1 - .1360 -.0643 -.1120 -.0863 - .1900 ·.0812 - .1780 -.0218 squared (x 100 ) <17. 9) (3. 73) (14.0) (10.5) (20.4) (3.03) (22.5) (1.05) 
Urban resident(= 1) .0006 .1750 .1100 .1470 -.0758 .1850 -.0790 .1120 
(.01) (5.39) (2.88) (6.81) (1.55) (3.20) (2.21) (3.85) w 
-...J
Hispanic(= 1) .0295 -.0667 .0954 -.0866 -.3100 .1640 -.0097 - .0360 
(.22) (.58) ( 1 .48) (2.40) (2.06) ( .77) (.16) C. 75) 
Woman's propertb_ 1 -.0251 -.0453 .0366 - .0252income (x 1,00 ) (.56) (4. 77) ( .96) (2.53) 
Woman's property income_ 1 .00057 .00032 -.00101 .00015squared (x 1,000,000 ) C.14) (1.57) (.47) (.55) 
Duration of unemployment -.0006 .00354 -.0232 -.0163 
benefits (.08) (.51) (2.75) (2.55) 
AFDC benefits indicator_ 1 - .1020 -.0135 - .1250 -.0480 (X 100 ) (4.29) C.64) (4.96) (2.55) 
Intercept -.0389 .6420 -.0946 .6210 -1.050 .2250 -1.230 .6590 
(.21) (5.45) C.48) (4.98) (4.90) (.58) (6.15) (1.90) 
Sigma/rho .855 .053 .695 .072 .844 .284 .644 .156 
(115.) (.19) (149.) (.41) (22.8) (1.51) (36.6) C.66) 
-Log likelihood 10930 12065 6195 8608 
Mean of dependent .687 1.62 .796 1.85 .258 1.46 .346 1.50 
variable ( .464) (.901) (.403) (.781) C.437) ( .843) C.476) ( .655) 
Sample size 7762 5334 9334 7430 7762 2001 9334 3241 
a The absolute value of the asymptotic t ratio is reported in ft:rentheses below each coefficient. The numbers reported in the row labeled "sigma/rho"
include first the standard error of the probit equations fo lowed by the correlation of the errors from the probit wage earner and log-linear wage
rate equations that are here estimated by joint maxillKJlll likelihood methods. Beneath both sigma and rho in parentheses is the ratio of this estimate 
to its standard error. 
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TABLE A-3 
PROBIT ESTIMATES OF PROBABILITY OF LIVING WITH A SPOUSE, 
FOR MEN, BY RACE AND AGEa 
Black White 
Explanatory variables 15-24 25-34 35-44 15-24 24-34 
Man's predicted log 6.99 2.50 1.57 1.88 2.59 
hourly wageb (3.29) (2.31) (1.14) (1.82) (4.29) 
Potential partner's -8.17 -.979 -.645 -2.37 -1.83 
predicted log hourly wageb (3.30) (.88) ( .48) (2.39) (3.03) 
Man's property income -.0522 .0579 -.0228 -.109 -.0341 
per year (xl0-3 ) (.23) (.52) (.88) (.97) (1.94) 
Age (years) .929 .235 -.101 .878 .210 
(1. 82) (.97) (.25) (2.67) (.91) 
Age Squared (xl0-2 ) -1.24 -.350 .101 -1.50 -.351 
(1.05) (.86) (.20) (1.97) (.90) 
Urban resident (=l) .511 -.108 - .139 -.289 -.294 
(2.34) (.96) (.95) (2.97) (3.71) 
Hispanic (=l) 2. 71 .133 .131 . 326 . 242 
(4.25) (. 37) (.29) (2.23) (1.95) 
AFDC benefits indicator -.0216 - . 0926 .157 - . 0966 - . 0393 
($ per month x10-2 > (.20) (1.26) (1. 59) (1.25) (.63) 
Medicaid expenditures - . 0911 - .139 .135 -.190 -.109 
($ per family 
per month xl0-2 ) 
(.64) (1. 57) (1. 20) (1.80) (1.35) 
AFDC-UP expenditures .476 .346 -.589 -10.7 .0652 
(average per family 
per month xl0-2 ) 
(.62) (. 72) (.95) (2.01) (.17) 
Intercept -18.4 -6.38 .682 -11.7 -4.39 
(3.30) (1.78) (.09) (3.41) (1.32) 
Chi squared statistic 363.6 118.9 22.4 562.6 111.2 
(10 df.) 
Mean of dependent variable .0717 .473 .627 .157 .669 
(.258) (.499) (.484) (.364) (.471) 




























8 Absolute value of asymptotic t ratio is reported in parentheses beneath probit 
coefficient. 
bPredicted log wage variable on the basis of the appropriate selection corrected 
wage equation in Table A-1. 
TABLE A-4 
TOBIT ESTIMATES FOR CHILDREN EVER BORN 
TO WOMEN, BY RACE AND AGE OF THE MOTHERa 
n[acK Wh1te 
Explanatory variables 15-24 25-34 35-44 15-65 15-24 24-34 35-44 15-65 
Woman's predicted logb -7.91 -4.13 -3.07 -3.98 -6.93 -3.68 -1.86 -2.42 
hourly wage (14.9) (9. 18) (3.55) (10.8) (11.4) (16.9) (6.11) (15.6) 
Potential partner's 5.18 2.46 .109 2.90 2.29 1.67 .450 .675 
predicted log hourly wageb (6.34) (2.94) (.08) (5.04) (3.41) (4.58) (1.05) (3.82) 
Woman's property income_ .267 .233 - .0345 -.123 -.900 -.0380 - .219 -.02463per year (x10 ) ( .73) (1.32) (.41) (2.67) (1.79) (1.06) (3.74) (2.39) 
Age (years) 2.41 .359 1.78 .682 1.66 .465 .278 .584 
(9.50) C1.16) (2.49) (22.8) (4.63) C1.61) (.57) (38.8) 
Age Squared cx10· 2> -4.62 -.315 -.207 -.742 -2.72 -.442 - .216 -.588 
(7.49) C.60) (2.28) (21.0) (3.14) (.90) C.35) (33.6) 
Urban resident (=1) -.210 - .296 - .180 -.299 -.289 -.188 -.297 -.278 
C1.48) (2.22) ( .84) (3.13) (2.04) C1.91) (2.46) (4.86) w 
I.O 
Hispanic (=1) -.0697 -.575 -.688 .0089 .737 .870 .527 .888 
(.21) C.36) C1.20) C.03) (3.75) (5.98) (2.60) (9.46) 
AFDC benefits indicato~ .0341 .135 - .0816 .0734 -.292 .0540 .0614 -.04632($ per month x10 ) C.34) C1.45) (.46) (.97) (2.49) C.69) (.61) C.95) 
Medicaid expenditures -.237 -.410 - .417 -.470 -.251 -.227 -.0863 -.162 
($ per family per month x10· 2) (1.89) (3.53) (2.03) (5.11) (1.59) (2.17) C.65) (2.53) 
AFDC-UP expenditures .357 -.864 -1.69 -.636 .987 -.338 -.708 -.191 
($per family per month x10·2, (.52) C1.36) C1.44) (1.25) (1.30) ( .66) (1.08) (.60) 
Intercept -28.2 -3.83 -29.7 -10.6 -18.0 -6.36 -2.90 -8.60 
(11.4) C.85) (2.12) (36.9) (5.09) (1.50) C.31 )' (37.4) 
Sigma 1.72 1.75 2.56 2.65 1.67 1.61 1.79 1.94 
(39.5) (57.0) (49.6) C106.) (26.4) (51.8) (52.3) (106.) 
Loglikelihood C-) 2799.0 3988.7 3277.1 16551. 1504.1 3612.0 3126.3 14971. 
-
aAbsolute value of asymptotic t ratio is reported in parentheses beneath Tobit coefficient. 
bPredicted log wage variable on the basis of the appropriate selection corrected wage equation in Tables A-1 and A-2. 
